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This  paper  incorporates  tax  morale  into  a  search  and  matching  model  of  equilibrium 
unemployment,  with  on-the-job  search,  extended  to  both  the  irregular  sector  and 
entrepreneurship. Tax morale is modelled as a social norm for tax compliance which renders 
evasion costly. The moral cost of tax evasion (the strength of the social norm) is negatively 
related to the fraction of entrepreneurs that evades taxes. Precisely, if the relationship is non-
linear, multiple equilibria may emerge, thus accounting for differences in-between regions and 
countries in the size of the irregular sector. The “good” equilibrium is in fact characterised, 
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1. Introduction 
Tax morale is usually defined as the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes, a moral 
obligation to pay taxes, a belief in contributing to society by paying taxes (see e.g. 
Torgler, 2007; Torgler and Schneider, 2007). The concept of tax morale was introduced 
in the tax compliance literature to resolve the tax compliance puzzle, i.e. to explain the 
high degree of tax compliance in presence, in many countries, of a very low deterrence 
level  (Torgler,  2007;  Slemrod,  2007).  Indeed,  traditional  models  à  la  Allingham  & 
Sandmo (for an overview see Sandmo, 2005), based only on risk aversion, monitoring 
probability and expected penalty, predict far too little compliance and far too much tax 
evasion (Feld and Frey, 2002).
1 
Tax  morale,  unlike  tax  evasion,  does  not  measure  individual  behaviour  but 
rather individual attitude. Hence, a high tax morale does not necessarily translate into a 
high level of tax compliance. However, empirical studies show the existence of a strong 
negative  correlation  between  the  level  of  tax  morale  and  the  extent  of  tax  evasion 
(Torgler, 2005, for Latin America; Alm and Torgler, 2006, for the U.S. and Europe; 
Alm, Martinez-Vazque and Torgler, 2006, for several transition countries; and Barone 
and Mocetti, 2009, for Italy). Furthermore, there is evidence of a causal link of tax 
morale on tax evasion (Halla, 2010). 
This theoretical paper incorporates tax morale into a search and matching model 
of equilibrium unemployment (Pissarides, 2000) with an irregular or shadow sector. Tax 
morale is modelled as an internalized social norm for tax compliance (Elster, 1989), or 
against tax evasion, which renders evasion costly (Falkinger, 1995; Kolm and Larsen, 
2002; Traxler, 2010). Hence, tax evasion involves a moral cost, in the sense that an 
individual feels a sense of guilt or remorse for deviating from the social norm, or for 
defecting  from  others’  expectations,  because  s/he  has  not  been  a  “good  member  of 
society” (Traxler, 2010; Kolm and  Larsen, 2002). However, the more  people evade 
taxes, the less attractive it is to follow the social norm. 
In this model, the moral cost of tax evasion is negatively related to the fraction 
of entrepreneurs that evades taxes, and that forms the irregular sector. Precisely, if the 
relationship  is  non-linear,  multiple  equilibria  may  emerge,  thus  accounting  for 
differences in-between regions and countries in the size of the irregular sector. The 
“good” equilibrium is in fact characterised, with respect to the “bad” one, by a smaller 
                                                 
1 Since the publication of Allingham and Sandmo’s (1972) economic model of income tax evasion, a 
huge number of studies have tried to find empirical support for the deterrent effect of audits and fines. 
The evidence, however, is weak and unstable (for a review see Kirchler et al., 2008).   2 
irregular sector and a stronger tax morale. Therefore, this model can account for the two 
main shortcomings of the standard tax evasion model, i.e. Allingham and Sandmo’s 
(1972) model, thus explaining both the high degree of tax compliance in many countries 
where the level of deterrence is too low (Torgler, 2007) and the huge differences in tax 
compliance between countries or regions despite the same tax and punishment policies, 
the so-called “Palermo-Milano puzzle” (Rothstein, 2000). 
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, it introduces tax morale into a 
matching model of equilibrium unemployment, with on-the-job search, extended to both 
the irregular sector and entrepreneurship. Second, it focuses on labour demand side but 
works  with  an  “equilibrium  unemployment”  model,  thus  capturing  both  the 
entrepreneurial choice and the labour market trade-off involved by the repression of 
irregular  activity  (irregular  employment  versus  unemployment).
2  Following  the  idea 
that both economic incentives and social norms drive individual behaviour, moral costs 
and  search  externalities  clash  in  the  entrepreneurial  choice.  Therefore,  when  an 
entrepreneur chooses the sector in which to create employment, s/he takes into account 
the moral cost as well as the start-up costs, the taxation, the monitoring probability and 
the expected penalty. In turn, the vacancies creation affects the probability of finding a 
job in both sectors. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the matching 
framework  used  in  the  analysis,  while  section  3  extents  the  model  to  include  the 
endogenous moral cost; finally, section 4 concludes the work. 
 
2. The model 
2.1  The matching framework and workers’ search 
The economy consists of a continuum of infinitely-lived individuals in the unit 
interval.  Each  individual  can  be  either  a  worker  or  an  entrepreneur.  Individuals  are 
identical in all respects except for their entrepreneurial ability  x, so that an individual 
can be an entrepreneur only if  0 > x , while if  0 = x  s/he can be a worker. We assume 
that an exogenous fraction k  of the population are endowed with positive x, while the 
complementary fraction  k - 1  are not, with  k k ³ - 1 . 
Entrepreneurs  can  either  operate  regularly  or  irregularly,  i.e.  against  the  tax 
regulations (evading taxes). Since the irregular activities are detected and repressed by 
                                                 
2  Kolm  and  Larsen  (2002)  introduce  tax  morale  into  a  matching  model  with  irregular  activities  but 
without  on-the-job  search  and  entrepreneurial  choice.  Traditional  models  of  labour  market  focus  on 
labour demand, whereas it is well-known that matching models focus on labour supply.   3 
the government, and hence for the same wage flow the irregular wage is discounted at a 
higher  rate,  all  workers  prefer  to  work  in  the  regular  sector.  Therefore,  workers 
employed in irregular jobs try to move into the regular ones.
3 
The matching frictions on the official side of the labour market are captured by a 
popular constant returns to scale (CRS) matching function (Pissarides, 2000; Petrongolo 






º ⇒q , where q  is the labour market 
tightness,  r v   is  the  number  of  vacancies  supplied  by  regular  firms,  u  is  the 
unemployment rate, and ns is the irregular or shadow employment rate, i.e. the measure 
of employed job-seekers. The subscript  { } s r i , Î  denotes the sector, where r = regular 
and s = shadow. 
A  crucial  and  novel  assumption  related  to  the  workers’  preferences  is 
introduced: only the unemployed workers who fail to find a job in the official sector 
search in the irregular one. Hence, this implies that matching initially takes place for 
official  jobs  and  then  for  irregular  jobs.
4  Therefore,  the  share  of  job-seekers  in  the 
irregular sector is equal to  ( ) [ ] dt g u u   1 ~ q - × º , since during a short interval of time dt, 
the  unemployed  worker  fails  to  find  a  job  in  the  official  sector  with  probability 
( )dt g   1 q - .  The  instantaneous  probability  of  finding  an  official  job,  ( ) q g ,  has  the 
following  standard  properties:  ( ) 0 ' > q g ,  ( ) 0 ' ' < q g ,  and  ( ) ( ) ( ) ¥ = ¥ ®   0 lim   0 q q g . 
Furthermore, we assume frictionless matching for irregular jobs, i.e. that there is a spot-
market  for  irregular  jobs.
5  The  number  of  irregular  matches  is  thus  given  by 
{ } s s v u m , ~ min = , where  r v  is the number of irregular vacancies. 
As  stated  above,  job  search  takes  place  in  two  sequential  steps:  at  first,  all 
unemployed workers search in the official sector, and afterwards (in the case of failure) 
they search in the irregular one. Hence, the value of searching for a job (U) is given by: 
                                                 
3 Time is continuous, and individuals are risk neutral and infinitely lived. We neglect possibilities of 
moonlighting, so workers can perform only one activity at a time. 
4 The presence of this “search path” followed by all unemployed workers is a novelty in the matching 
literature with respect to the standard assumptions of directed search and random search. 
5 There are several other recent papers that do not consider search frictions in the shadow sector. Zenou 
(2008) assumes that the irregular sector is perfectly competitive; Satchi and Temple (2006) only consider 
the possibility of self-employment in the irregular sector, modelled as staging post for salaried work in the 
official  one;  in  Albrecht  et  al.  (2009) opportunities  in  the  irregular  sector  arrive  to  the  unemployed 
workers at an exogenous rate. Finally, although irregularity is not specifically addressed, Dulleck et al. 
(2006) assume frictionless matching for low-skilled jobs and matching frictions for high-skilled jobs. 
Nevertheless, for middle-income countries, at least, matching frictions in the official sector can help to 
explain the existence of a sizeable irregular sector, provided either that workers receive a relatively large 
share of the match surplus, or that recruitment costs are significant (Satchi and Temple, 2006).   4 
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] [ ] U W g U W g k rU s r - × × - + - × + - = g q q 1  
where r is the discount rate;  k  is the exogenous search cost which reflects the search 
effort (implicitly assumed) of unemployed workers;  { } u v u s
~ / , ~ min º g  is the probability 
of finding an irregular job, and Wi is the value for being employed:
6 
[ ] r r r W U w rW - × + = d ;  ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] s r s s s W W g W U w rW - × + - × + + = q r d  
where  wi  is  the  wage  rate;  d   is  the  exogenous  job  destruction  rate;  and  r   is  the 
exogenous probability of a firm being discovered (and destroyed) as irregular. As in 
Pissarides (2000), it is implicitly assumed that employed job-seekers and unemployed 
workers search with the same intensity, and that they are equally good at finding official 
jobs. Hence, official jobs arrive to each job-seeker at the same rate  ( ) q g . 
Finally, given the assumption of matches without frictions in the irregular sector, 
it may emerge the case  u vs
~ ³ , where all unemployed workers eventually find a job in 
their “search path”, i.e. the outflow from the unemployment pool is exactly equal to the 
unemployment rate  ( ) ( ) [ ] ( g q q × - × - × - dt g u dt g u u   1    is in fact zero if  ) 1 = g . However, 
since the search frictions in the regular sector could cause a small (large) number of 
matches  (unemployed),  a  non-trivial  result  requires  that  s v u > ~ .
7  In  this  case,  the 
probability of filling an irregular vacancy is equal to 1 and the bargaining power of 
workers who search for an irregular job is zero. As a result, the irregular wage is equal 
to a given minimum wage  b , with  s r w b w º > .
8 Therefore, a consistent equilibrium 
requires as a necessary condition that  U W W s r > > . 
 
2.2  Entrepreneurship 
In this section, we follow Lisi and Pugno (2010). Entrepreneurs are born with a 
specific and positive entrepreneurial ability x which is drawn from a known distribution, 
F : [xmin, xmax] → [0,1], and affects the job productivity: 
( ) [ ] r r r r V J q c rV - × + - = q ;    ( ) t d - - = × + r r w xp J r  
                                                 
6 The search “timing” (namely, unemployed workers never search in the irregular sector before failing to 
find a job in the official one) implies that the two steps of the “search path” are independent. There is no 
positive  flow  of  utility  associated  with  the  job  search  value  because  the  search  consumes  the  time 
(leisure) and resources of the unemployed worker, who does not always receive unemployment benefits. 
7  This  condition  could  remain  unsatisfied  when  unemployment  is  very  small,  i.e.  the  probability  of 
finding an official job is very large. But in this case the underground economy would be a negligible 
phenomenon. 
8 Wages in “bad” (irregular) jobs do not depend on outside market conditions. This is a standard feature 
of matching models with on-the-job search, as noted by Pissarides (2000) and Boeri and Garibaldi (2002).   5 
[ ] s s s V J rV - = ,      ( ) [ ] mc b xp J g r s - - = × + + + f r q d  
where Vi is the value of a vacancy; Ji is the value of a filled job; cr is the start-up cost; x 
is  the  entrepreneurial  ability;  p  is  labour  productivity;  while  ( ) q q   refers  to  the 
instantaneous  probability  of  filling  a  vacancy  in  the  official  sector,  with  ( ) 0 ' < q q , 
( ) 0 > q ' ' q , and  ( ) ( ) ( ) 0   lim   0 ¥ = ¥ ® q q q . Note that from the irregular sector stand-point 
on-the-job  search  operates  as  an  increase  in  the  discount  rate,  since  it  reduces  the 
average duration of employment.
9 The parameter  ( ) 1   0, Î f  captures the fact that the 
irregular sector generally utilises less efficient technology; indeed, shadow activities are 
often seen as labour intensive activities (Busato and Chiarini, 2004). 
Formal firms have to pay a lump sum tax t , whereas irregular firms do not pay 
taxes but sustain a moral cost,  mc, which captures the non-pecuniary costs associated 
with  tax  evasion,  i.e.  the  “internal  sanctions  associated  with  emotions  like  guilt  or 
remorse” (Traxler, 2010; Elster, 1989).
10 
A successful official match performs a net productivity equal to  ( ) t - xp . We 
assume that regular wages are given by  ( ) t b - × xp , where  1 0 < < b  is the bargaining 
power of workers.
11 To ensure that regular production takes place we also assume that 
( ) ( ) r c xp > - × - t b 1 . If this did not hold true, there would be no regular jobs, which is a 
trivial case. 
The cut-off condition, which defines a threshold level of entrepreneurial ability, 
Î R [ max min x x , ], such that the marginal entrepreneur is indifferent to operating in the 
irregular or regular sector, is the following (entrepreneurs’ indifference condition): 
( ) ( ) R x V R x V s r = = =                                  (1) 
hence, R  can be derived in a straightforward manner (see Appendix A): 
( ) [ ] ( ) ( )

























                                        (2) 
                                                 
9 Alternatively, one can consider the case where δ, ρ or g(θ) strike, the match is destroyed but the job is 
not, that is, the job turns into a vacancy. This case would not change the qualitative results of the analysis. 
10 In Kim (2003), the moral cost depends on whether evasion is detected or not. However, this assumption 
does not significantly change the results of the analysis. 
11 We use the Rubinstein’s solution to a non-cooperative bargaining where it is impossible to search while 
negotiating. This solution, which is used by Mortensen (2005), neglects the outside options, and hence the 
effect of labour market tightness on wage. Indeed, as claimed by Mortensen himself (2005), the standard 
specification (see Pissarides, 2000) adds complexity but no further insight.   6 
with  ( ) ( )







q 1 ,  and  ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) q q r d L º + + + × + g r r 1 .  The  restrictions 
which ensure the positivity of  R  (see Appendix A) imply that the intercept of  ( ) x Vr  is 
more negative than the intercept of  ( ) x Vs , and that the slope of  ( ) x Vr  is steeper than the 
slope  of  ( ) x Vs   (see  figure  1).  Consequently,  for  ⇒ > R x s r V V > ,  while  for 
⇒ < R x r s V V > . This implies the following remark: 
========== Figure 1 about here (now at the end) ========== 
Remark 1. Regular jobs are managed by the more able entrepreneurs. 
This key result is consistent with the standard assumption that irregular jobs are low 
productivity jobs (see e.g. Boeri and Garibaldi, 2002, 2006; Kolm and Larsen, 2010). 
Given the c.d.f. of  x, i.e.  ( ) x F , then a fraction  ( ) R F  of the entrepreneurs are 
irregular,  while  a  complementary  fraction  ( ) R F - 1   include  regular  entrepreneurs. 
Hence, the total number of entrepreneurs (either posting a vacancy or producing) in the 
irregular sector is  ( ) s s v n R F + = × k , while the share  ( ) [ ] r r v n R F + = - × 1 k  runs a firm 
in the regular sector. 
A  key  property  of  equation  (2),  which  can  be  called  the  curve R - ,  is  that 
0 > ¶ ¶ q / R  (for its derivation see the Appendix A). This property captures the effect of 
the well-know search or congestion externalities (see Pissarides, 2000): if the ratio of 
hiring firms to searching workers increases, the probability of rationing is higher for the 
average  firm.  Hence,  the  more  difficult  it  is  to  fill  a  regular  vacancy  and  more 
entrepreneurs enter the irregular sector. 
We make use of the fact that matching is pair-wise to derive an equation for the 
determination of q  (see Appendix B): 
( ) ( )
( )














                                (3) 
This equation sets up another relationship, with respect to equation (2), between q and 
R, and it will be called the  curve - q . A key property of this curve is that  0 / < dR dq : 
intuitively,  at  higher  R   there  are  more  irregular  entrepreneurs  and  fewer  regular 
entrepreneurs, so less jobs are created in the regular sector. 
Therefore, equations (2) and (3) can be represented in the same diagram with 
axes [ ] R   , q , as in fig. 2, and the following remark holds: 
========== Figure 2 about here (now at the end) ========== 
Remark 2. There is a unique couple of ( ) R   , q  in this two-sector economy.   7 
The equilibrium values of the two key variables of the model, i.e. the labour market 
tightness and the ability threshold for entrepreneurs to indifferently operating in one of 
the  two  sectors,  can  thus  be  obtained.  In  short,  the  model  works  as  follows: 
entrepreneurs  create  employment  in  the  regular  or  irregular  sector  according  to  the 
threshold level of their entrepreneurial ability, whereas unemployed workers direct their 
search  towards  the  vacant  jobs  according  to  the  “search  path”.  Hence,  after  their 
creation, the irregular vacancies are (immediately) filled once the unemployed workers 
enter the irregular sector and search for a job. 
 
2.3  Unemployment rate and policy implications 
The steady-state equilibrium conditions determining the employment rates  r n  
and  s n  are given by:  
( ) ( ) 3 2 1 4 4 3 4 4 2 1
outflow inflow
1 r r n n g × = - - × d k q ( ) ( )








                 (4) 
( ) ( ) [ ] ( )
( ) [ ] 1 + + +
×
= ⇒ × + + = - ×
q r d
k
q r d k
g
R F




s 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 2 1 4 43 4 42 1              (5) 
since  ( ) s r n u n + = - -k 1 , and  s v u = ×~ g . Finally, using the summing-up condition (or 
unemployment identity), i.e.  s r n n u + + = -k 1 , we obtain the unemployment rate (the 
Beveridge curve) of this economy: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) [ ]
( )




















( ) [ ]
( )















u                                                           (6) 
note that  0 lim = ¥ ® s n r , but the steady-state unemployment rate would be higher, since 
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] q d d k r g u + × - = ¥ ® / 1 lim .  This  result  explains  why  governments  may  be 
reluctant to repress the irregular sector (Boeri and Garibaldi, 2006). 
Furthermore, the final effect of labour market tightness on the unemployment 
rate in presence of an irregular sector is a priori ambiguous, thus leading to a possible 
“inverse” Beveridge curve: 
( ) ( )
( ) [ ]
( )
( ) [ ]
( ) ( )
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R F R F
. 
As  in  Lisi  and  Pugno  (2010),  the  monitoring  rate  plays  a  key  role  in  the 
relationship  between  unemployment  and  irregular  employment.  Indeed,  if  the 
monitoring  rate  is  sufficiently  large,  an  increase  in  labour  market  tightness  (in  the 
probability of finding an regular job) decreases both the irregular employment and the 
unemployment rate, so that the ‘vacancies-unemployment’ relationship (the so-called 
Beveridge Curve) remains negative also in presence of an irregular sector. However, an 
“inverse”  Beveridge  curve  cannot  be  ruled  out  ex-ante,  depending,  besides  the 
monitoring rate, on the share of irregular entrepreneurs in the economy. 
 
3. Endogenous moral cost 
In this section we extend the model in order to make the moral cost endogenous. 
The  moral  cost  of  tax  evasion  (i.e.  the  strength  of  the  social  norm)  crucially  and 
negatively  depends  on  the  share  of  tax  evaders  in  the  society  (Gordon,  1989),  the 
others’ compliance (Traxler, 2010), and the size of the shadow economy (Kolm and 
Larsen, 2002). In economies where a rather large fraction of the population is employed 
in the irregular sector, the moral cost is low compared to the cost of tax evasion in an 
economy where a rather small fraction of the population is employed in the irregular 
sector (Kolm and Larsen, 2002). More precisely, we assume that the moral cost is an 
increasing function of the size of the regular sector as follows: 
( ) q b a mc + =                                                                                                         (7) 
where  a is the individual specific degree of tax morale, and  ( ) q b  is the non-pecuniary 
costs associated with emotions like guilt or remorse which depends on the fraction of 
irregular  entrepreneurs  in  the  population.  Since  ( ) 0 ' > q b   and  ( ) 0 0 = b ,  and 
( ) ¥ < ¥ ® q q mc lim ,  the  lower  the  regular  sector,  the  more  tax  evasion  is  generally 
accepted, and the lower the moral cost.
12 
Therefore,  when  an  entrepreneur  chooses  the  sector  in  which  to  create 
employment, s/he takes into account the moral cost as well as the start-up cost, the 
taxation, and the monitoring probability. Indeed, if the function (7) is plugged into (2), 
then the relationship between  R and q  may change significantly, since moral costs and 
                                                 
12  Also  according  to  Gordon’s  (1989)  approach,  the  moral  cost  of  tax  evasion  depends  on  both  the 
individual specific degree of social norm internalization (exogenously given), and the fraction of evaders 
in the society (endogenous).   9 
search  externalities  clash  in  the  entrepreneurial  choice.  Hence,  the  curve R-   may 
display decreasing segments, thus cutting the  curve - q  more than once. Therefore: 
Remark 3. Multiple equilibria cannot be ruled out ex-ante and depend on the 
form of the function  ( ) q mc . 
Figure 3 depicts the possibility of three equilibria: this may occur if (7) is a 
function characterised by non-linearities which are typical of contagion-type diffusion,
13 
i.e. it is a logistic function. In this case, two stable equilibria emerge with an unstable 
equilibrium in the middle. It can thus be represented a “virtuous or vicious circle”, since 
tax  morale  affects  compliance  behaviour,  i.e.  a  higher  (lower)  tax  morale  reduces 
(increases)  the  level  of  tax  evasion  (Halla,  2010),  but  a  lower  (higher)  level  of  tax 
evasion, captured by the size of the shadow economy, also implies, ceteris paribus, a 
higher (lower) tax morale (Frey and Torgler, 2007; Halla, 2010). 
========== Figure 3 about here (now at the end) ========== 
In  short,  economies  with  a  lower  tax  morale  can  end  up  in  an  equilibrium 
(“bad”) where the irregular sector is larger, and economies with a higher tax morale can 
end up in an equilibrium (“good”) where the irregular sector is smaller. 
Different  equilibria  can  capture  the  case  of  some  regions  which  exhibit  a 
persistence  of  the  shadow  sector  in  very  different  proportions  with  respect  to  other 
regions, although both types of regions are characterised by a similar institutional setup. 
For example, the countries in the Western Europe exhibit a smaller shadow economy 
with  respect  to  the  countries  in  Eastern  Europe,  but  also  a  higher  rule  of  law  and 
corruption perception index, which may be taken as proxies for tax morale (see table 1 
at the end).
14 An even better example is the Italy’s North-South divide, because tax and 
punishment policies are the same all over the country, whereas the two regions that 
differ in their history, i.e. in the social traditions and which persist over generations 
(Halla, 2010). 
Our benchmark model of section 2 suggests that differences in-between regions 
and countries in the proportion of the irregular sector may be due to different moral 
costs (Halla, 2010; Alm, Martinez-Vazquez and Torgler, 2006; Torgler, 2007; Alm and 
Torgler, 2006; Torgler, 2005; Kolm and Larsen, 2002; Posner; 2000). Extending the 
                                                 
13  The  S-shaped  pattern  is  based  on  the  idea  of  critical  mass  in  imitative  behaviour  on  the  spatial 
dimension (Schelling, 1978: ch.3; Granovetter 1978). 
14 With two outliers represented by the “virtuous” ex-Czechoslovakia (Czech Republic and Slovakia) and 
by the “corrupt” Italy. The “rule of law” is the foundation of each real democracy. Indeed, institutional 
arrangements, such as direct democracy, are correlated with a high level of tax morale (Alm, McClelland 
and Schulze, 1999; Feld and Tyran, 2002; Torgler, 2005).   10 
model for making moral costs endogenous, as in this section, focuses the attention to the 
diffusion process of the standard in tax moral. This may help policy makers in finding 
proper interventions to increase tax moral. A bad news is that tax morale is usually 
regarded as very slowly-changing (Lindbeck and Nyberg, 2006; Halla, 2010), but our 
good news is that policy intervention may be helped by an endogenous dynamic. 
 
4. Conclusions 
This theoretical paper incorporates tax morale into a search and matching model 
of equilibrium unemployment, with on-the-job search, extended to both the irregular 
sector  and  entrepreneurship.  Tax  morale  is  introduced  as  a  social  norm  against  tax 
evasion (or for tax compliance) which renders evasion costly. The moral cost of tax 
evasion is negatively related to the fraction of entrepreneurs that evades taxes. Precisely, 
if it is non-linear, multiple equilibria may emerge, thus accounting for differences in-
between regions and countries in the size of the irregular sector. Therefore, this model 
can  help  explain  the  tax  compliance  puzzle,  i.e.  why  people  pay  taxes  despite  the 
existence of low monitoring probabilities and penalty rates or in presence of the same 
deterrence policies. 
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Appendixes 
 
Appendix A: Properties of equation (2) 
From the Bellman equations on the demand side it is straightforward to obtain: 
( ) [ ]
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) [ ] q d
t b q

























( ) [ ]
( ) ( ) t q
q




















since  ( ) ( )








, and ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) q q r d L º + + + × + g r r 1 . By applying equality 
(1), equation (2) for R can be derived. 
The threshold value  R  is a special  x , so that it must be positive since  0 > ³ min x x . 
Sufficient conditions for the positivity of R  are that both the numerator and the denominator of 
equation (2) are positive. For labour market tightness which going to zero, this means that:
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since  ( ) ( ) d b q + - = W ® r lim / 1 0   by  the  l’Hôpital  rule,  and  ( ) ( ) r d q + + × + = L ® r r lim 1 0 . 
Therefore, sufficient conditions for R > 0 are that b, mc, and f  are sufficiently small, and t  










 are that the numerator of 
equation (2) is increasing in q , while the denominator is not. Indeed, 
￿  the numerator of R  is increasing in q  if:  
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,  and  ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 ' 1 ' > × + = L q q g r ,  i.e.  it  is 
sufficient that  ( ) ( ) r r cr × - × ³ + × b t d 1 . This is a realistic restriction since b is a substantial 
fraction (usually  5 . 0 = b ); 
￿  the denominator of R  is not increasing in q  if: 
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This condition can be easily proved if the properties of matching function in the usual Cobb-
Douglas form are applied:
15 
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,  with 
( ) 0 lim 0 = G ® q q . Therefore, since  ¥ < <q 0 , then a sufficiently small f >0 (as already stated 
above) ensures that the denominator of R  is not increasing in q . 
Finally,  0 0 > º ® a q R lim , by conditions (A.1) and (A.2); and  ¥ = ¥ ® R limq , since  0 = W ¥ ® q lim , 
and  ¥ = L ¥ ® q lim . Note that  max x < a , since equation (2) has been built for  Î R [ max min x x , ]. 
 
Appendix B: Properties of equation (3) 
The evolution of employment  n can be expressed in terms of both worker’s transition 
rates and firm’s transition rates (see Fonseca et al. (2001) and Pissarides (2002)), 
[ ] ( ) r r r n g n n × - × - - = d q k 1 &  
( ) [ ] { } ( ) r r r n q n R F n × - × - - × = d q k 1 &  
Hence, in steady-state ( 0 = r n & ), we get: 
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From (B.1) and (B.2), It follows that for any level of employment it must be true that: 
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By the properties of the matching function and because of the restriction  ( ) 1 1 / £ -k k , the left-
hand side of (B.3) is increasing in q ; whereas, the right-hand side of (B.3) is decreasing in  R . 
Therefore, total differentiation of equation (B.3) gives a negatively sloping relation between q  
and  R . As  R  tends to  max x , q  tends to 0, since  ( ) R F  tends to 1; whereas, a positive level of 
0
~
> =q q  as  R  tends to  min x  is obtained by the fixed point theorem. In fact, if  R  tends to 
min x , then  ( ) R F  tends to 0, so that: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) d q
k
k
d q q + ×
-
= × + g g
1
                             (B.4) 
Note that for  0 = q  the intercept of the r.h.s. of (B.4) is higher than the intercept of the l.h.s., 
while the slope of the l.h.s. of (B.4) is steeper than the slope of the r.h.s.: hence, a unique and 
positive q  exists when R  tends to  min x . 
                                                 
15 Surveying the empirical evidence, Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) summarize the wealth of support 
for a Cobb-Douglas matching function with constant returns to scale.   13 
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Table 1. Data Appendix 
European countries  Rule of Law 
index * 
Shadow Economy (% 




Austria  99  9.8  7.90 
Belgium  89  22.5  7.10 
Denmark  99.5  18.2  9.30 
Finland  97.6  18.5  8.90 
France  90  15.4  6.90 
Germany  93.3  16.1  8.00 
Ireland  94.3  16  8.00 
Italy  62.2  27.2  4.30 
Luxembourg  96.2  9.9  8.20 
Malta  91.4  27  5.20 
Netherlands  94.7  13  8.90 
Norway  100  19.5  8.60 
Portugal  83.7  22.5  5.80 
Spain  85.2  22.9  6.10 
Sweden  98.1  19.6  9.20 
United Kingdom  92.3  12.9  7.70 
Bulgaria  51.2  38.5  3.80 
Cyprus  84.2  29.4  6.60 
Czech Republic  77  19.8  4.90 
Estonia  84.7  40.3  6.60 
Greece  73.2  29.9  3.80 
Hungary  76.1  25.8  5.10 
Latvia  71.3  41.7  4.50 
Lithuania  67.5  31.9  4.90 
Poland  65.1  28  5.00 
Romania  53.6  36.3  3.80 
Slovakia  67  19.7  4.50 
Slovenia  82.3  28  6.60 
Turkey  55.5  32.9  4.40 
* percentile rank (year 2008): from 0 (worst) to 100 (best). Source: 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/mc_countries.asp 
** (1996-2007 average). Source: Schneider et al. (2010) 
*** (year 2009). Source: 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009/cpi_2009_table 
(note: a higher corruption perception index implies a weaker corruption). 
 